E abordarea unui american lucid, dar care vorbeşte de unul singur, fiindcă, la Tel Aviv, likudnicii au o cu totul altă abordare, plus degetele plasaste deasupra butoanelor roşii. Mearsheimer oferă o alternativă la transformarea Orientului Mijlociu într-un nou super-poligon de tir. Cu puţin succes, însă.
Treaba cu avutul unei arme nucleare e, până la urmă, cu două tăişuri, sau cu efecte contrare. Valabil şi pentru Israel, ca şi pentru Iran:
"The reason that states want nuclear weapons in almost all cases is because they are the ultimate deterrent. [...] It’s also important to understand, that even if you have nuclear weapons, it doesn’t mean other countries won’t attack you. Again, I’m arguing that if you have nuclear weapons, they won’t attack your homeland and threaten your survival, but you want to remember that in 1973 even though Israel had nuclear weapons and the Syrians and Egyptians understood that Israel had nuclear weapons, those two Arab states did initiate the famous October War, or Yom Kippur War."
Dorinţa Israelului de a da cu vecinii de pământ trădează un fals sentiment de insecuritate. Deoarece:
"First of all, there is a fundamentally different strategic environment today than existed in the 1950s and 1960s. And it’s much more favorable from Israel’s point of view. The Soviet Union, as we all know, has gone away. And it is not supplying either Egypt or Syria, or anybody in the neighborhood with meaningful conventional fighting force. Furthermore, Egypt has changed its approach to dealing with Israel and is now effectively a relatively friendly state. [...] No state in its right mind would pick a fight with the Israelis. And every time it looks like the Syrians and the Israelis might get into a fight, the Syrians are backtracking like the best quarterback or safety in the NFL. It’s really quite amazing. Nobody in their right mind would pick a fight with the IDF. So I think in terms of the strategic environment, conventional deterrence alone takes care of the Israelis."
Pasajul de mai jos se referă la ipocrizia pe care vor unii să o creeze, pentru a fixa ideea de insecuritate căreia Israelul nu i-ar face faţă:
"It seems quite clear to me that the elites in the Arab world, the elites in Europe, and the elites in the United States and by elites I mean policy-makers, experts, and even the informed public (people who pay attention to this when they go home at night and read the newspaper, and read books and magazines) none of them are being fooled. We all kind of figured out a long time ago that Israel has nuclear weapons. And I’ve never talked to any intelligent person who pays careful attention to Middle East politics who tried to pretend to me that Israel doesn’t have nuclear weapons. Indeed, we all talk as if Israel had nuclear weapons."
Ceea ce este totuşi adevărat este faptul că, în absenţa utilizării Statelor Unite, pe post de bătăuş de avangardă în cartier, Israelul, cu forţa sa nucleară şi convenţională cu tot, nu se simte bine. Asta, deoarece, la o adică, sacrificiile umane şi materiale ar fi considerabile. Să ne uităm bine pe hartă şi la cifrele demografice din zonă! Aşa că, se tot încearcă introducerea unui semn de egalitate între interesele israeliene şi cele americane:
"Now, it’s very important to understand that Israel’s supporters in the United States go to enormous lengths to make the argument that there’s no difference between Israel’s interests and America’s interests. Because once you open the possibility that the two countries have different interests, then they’re forced to choose, in a very public fashion. And, of course, they’ll invariably choose Israel’s interests over America’s interests and that is not something that they want to have happen in public. This is why they’ve gone to great lengths to create this situation where it looks like Obama and Netanyahu have patched up all their differences, to the extent that there are differences they’ll be handled behind closed doors because they don’t want those differences out in the open.
But, of course, as we all know no two countries have the same interests."
În realitate, interesele sunt divergente rău, chiar dacă ne referim doar la un singur exemplu, foarte relevant însă, din istoria nu prea îndepărtată:
Because again it wasn’t in our interest.
And the two best examples that show how it’s not in our national interest are what happened during the 1973 war. During that conflict, the Israelis looked like they were in dire straits for the first few days. And they wanted the United States to immediately resupply them. The Nixon administration said "no" because the Nixon administration judged quite correctly that once the Israelis recovered from the initial surprise that they would do very well. And therefore the US government did not what to give the Israelis at that point more arms. The Israelis then threatened to pull the nuclear weapons out, and began talking about using nuclear weapons. That, not surprisingly, spooked the Americans who immediately began resupplying the Israelis even though they did not what to do that."
Uitându-se în globul lui de sticlă, John Mearsheimer se cam sperie:
"Let me just conclude with a few words on where this situation is headed.
I actually believe the situation is going to get much worse over time. I believe that we’re not going to have an Israeli-Palestinian peace settlement. I believe that talk of a two-state solution and all this talk about moving from "proximity talks" to "direct talks " is a charade. I find it hard to believe that people in this town take this discussion seriously. I think, at this point in time, that you’re going to get a "Greater Israel," and it either is, or is going to be, an apartheid state. It is going to cause us enormous problems, in the Middle East, or in the Arab and Islamic world. It is going to continue to keep relations between Israel and its neighbors in a troublesome state.
On the proliferation front, I would not be surprised if Iran and other countries continue to move down the nuclear road. You already see the Jordanians expressing an interest in developing a signification nuclear enrichment capability. It would be interesting to see if Turkey does. As I said before, I think Iraq will want nuclear weapons if Iran has nuclear weapons. It would be foolish not to from an Iraqi point of view. A Middle East where more than one state has nuclear weapons makes me very, very nervous.
What of course all of this is going to point to is the fact that America’s interests and Israel’s interests are going to continue to diverge. And the end result of that, back here in the United States, is that the lobby is going to have to work overtime to cover that up and make it look like everything is hunky-dory when in fact it’s not. And that has all sorts of negative consequences for domestic politics.
So I think things are very bad now but I’m sad to say they’re only going to get worse."
Întreg articolul (care reprezintă, de fapt, expunerea lui Mearsheimer la o conferinţă) poate fi găsit la http://original.antiwar.com/john-mearsheimer/2010/07/08/israels-nukes-harm-us-national-interests/
Fotografia este de la http://colbertnation.mtvnimages.com/images/shows/colbert_report/video_archive/season_3/cr_03124_06_gst_v6.jpg